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State ex rel Washington University Medical Center Development Corp. v Gaertnert
Urban redevelopment can claim responsibility for revitalizing many
inner-city areas in the United States.2 The process of redevelopment gener-
ally originates with a statutory grant of the state's condemnation power to
urban redevelopers approved by the city.' The city then announces the
creation of a "blighted area," an inner-city district recommended for rede-
velopment because of its physical deterioration, crime rate, or inability to
pay taxes.4 The redeveloper then condemns buildings one at a time, a pro-
cedure that often spans several years before the final building is taken.
5
This delay between the announcement of the blight and the condemnation
of a particular building has created a peculiar phenomenon. Once occu-
pants know that the area is earmarked for future destruction and rebuild-
ing, they tend to abandon the area. This exodus deprives building owners
of rental income they would have received but for the announced blight.
Police protection typically dissipates. Landowners become unwilling to
sink money into upkeep. Vandalism increases and deterioration acceler-
ates. The market value of buildings may plunge between the announce-
1. 626 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. En Banc 1982). For a critical view of the same case,
see Denial ofa Landowner's Counterclaim: Another Obstacle on the Road to Just Compensation,
50 UMKC L. REv. 353 (1982).
2. See 18 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 1084 (1978).
3. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 21 authorizes laws reclaiming blighted areas for re-
development. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.130(2) (1978) allows a redevelopment corpo-
ration to acquire real property by eminent domain "only when so empowered by
the legislative authority of the cities affected by this chapter." See id. § 533.060.
4. 626 S.W.2d at 375. The target areas are defined by statute as follows:
"Blighted area" shall mean that portion of the city within which the legis-
lative authority of such city determines that by reason of age, obsoles-
cence, inadequate or outmoded design or physical deterioration, have
become economic and social liabilities, and that such conditions are con-
ducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay rea-
sonable taxes.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(2) (1978).
5. 626 S.W.2d at 376.
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ment of blight and the condemnation of the particular building.6 If the
amount of compensation a condemning authority must pay is limited to the
fair market value of the structure at the time it is actually condemned, the
landowner's ultimate recovery may be only a fraction of what it would have
been had condemnation occurred at the time of the announcement. This
economic devastation to landowners is termed "condemnation blight."7
The Gaertner court faced just such a case. The landowner attempted to
raise his demand for compensation as a counterclaim in a condemnation
proceeding. The Missouri Supreme Court disposed of the case on the
ground that a counterclaim may not be raised in a condemnation action
but indicated in dicta that the landowner could bring his claim for lost
rents in a subsequent tort action.
I. THE CASE
On June 13, 1974, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen declared blighted
an area that contained the landowner's apartment property.8 On February
6. Id. at 375-76. A discussion of the problem's scope is found in 7A P. ROHAN
& M. RESKIN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.02[I][a] (rev. 3d ed.
1981):
Once it is known that a project is planned tenants may move out and
become impossible to replace; land may become unsalable or salable only
at a depressed price; maintenance of land and buildings may cease; ordi-
nances prohibiting new construction may be passed; and police protection
may drop off, thereby encouraging vandalism. The blight caused by a
combination of any or all of these factors has a reinforcing effect: once
begun, the decline feeds upon itself. . . . [D]elays of five years between
planning and commencement of a condemnation action are common, and
can extend for as long as thirteen years. When the award finally comes, it
may be only a small portion of the land's original value.
7. "The term 'condemnation blight' is used to denote the debilitating effect
upon value of threatened, imminent, or potential condemnation." 4 J. SACKMAN &
R. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151[5] (rev. 3d
ed. 1981). The unfairness to the landowner may best be seen in Gould v. Land
Clearance for Redev. Auth., 610 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980). In 1967, the
landowner ran an eight-unit apartment, a fully occupied building valued at $30,000
to $35,000. In that year, Gould received notice that her property was being consid-
ered for redevelopment. In January 1969, Kansas City's City Council approved the
urban renewal plan. The condemnor assured Gould that her structure would be
acquired and. advised her to make only minimal improvements. After 1969, the
condemnor informed Gould repeatedly that acquisition of her property was immi-
nent. Despite the need for major improvement she was cautioned to "just keep it
up." Occupancy of the building fell to two. Thieves broke in and stole radiators
and bathtubs. By 1978, Gould's property had yet to be acquired and had only
negligible value. Id. at 362-64. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of
Gould's petition for damages. Id. at 367. The court saw no evidence of "untoward
activity or aggravated delay." Id. at 364.
8. 626 S.W.2d at 374. An area may be designated as blighted notwithstand-
1983]
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28, 1975, the Board approved a redevelopment plan submitted by the con-
demnor, a redevelopment corporation, to acquire property by eminent do-
main in the designated area. Property to be condemned included the
landowner's apartments.9 Two years later, on April 18, 1977, the con-
demnor instituted a condemnation proceeding against the landowner.
Commissioners appointed by the trial judge'0 appraised the property at
$45,000. The condemnor excepted to the appraisal and requested a jury
determination on the amount of damages."
The landowner counterclaimed for lost rents spanning the three-year
period between the designation of the property as blighted and the institu-
tion of condemnation proceedings. At trial, he claimed that, due to public-
ity and direct communication to tenants and owners, the impending
condemnation became common knowledge. He further asserted that the
activities of the condemnor caused loss of rental income from his property
by inducing current tenants to vacate, encouraging vandalism, and discour-
aging prospective tenants from renting. He alleged that, beginning on the
date the condemnor submitted its redevelopment plan,' 2 an unlawful tak-
ing had occurred in violation of the Missouri Constitution"' and the fifth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. He de-
manded the reasonable rental value of the property between the date of the
plan's submission and the commencement of the condemnation trial but
made no claim for the reduced market value of the property.' 4
The condemnor sought to prohibit the trial judge from further action
until the counterclaim was dismissed. The Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District ruled in favor of the condemnor and issued a writ of
ing the presence of nonoffensive property in the area. Parking Systems v. Kansas
City Downtown Redev. Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1975). Judicial review of a
blighting ordinance is limited to whether the legislative determination was arbi-
trary, fraudulent, in bad faith, collusive, or beyond the scope of the city's power.
Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civil Plaza Redev. Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo. En
Banc 1976); Maryland Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1979).
9. 626 S.W.2d at 374.
10. Appointment and duties of commissioners are governed by Mo. REV.
STAT. § 523.040 (1978); Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.06.
11. A jury trial must be provided to determine compensation in a condemna-
tion proceeding upon the request of either party. Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.060
(1978).
12. The plan was submitted approximately four months after passage of the
blighting ordinance. 626 S.W.2d at 374.
13. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26 provides "[t]hat private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation." The section further pro-
vides that "the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of the own-
er therein divested" until the owner is paid.
14. 626 S.W.2d at 375.
[Vol. 48
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prohibition.'" The Missouri Supreme Court ordered a transfer. 6 In the
supreme court, the condemnor reasserted its argument that a counterclaim
is not cognizable in a condemnation proceeding.' 7 The landowner main-
tained that a claim for lost rents arising out of the same transaction or oc-
currence as the subject matter of the proceeding constituted a compulsory
counterclaim and must be raised in any civil action, including a condemna-
tion proceeding.'
8
II. PERMISSIBILITY OF COUNTERCLAIMS
The Missouri Supreme Court held that a counterclaim cannot be
maintained in a condemnation proceeding.' 9 Describing the issue as a re-
curring problem unresolved in Missouri,2 ° the court chose between two pro-
cedural rules that suggested opposite conclusions. Missouri Revised
Statutes chapter 523 deals with condemnation proceedings; upon a request
for a jury to appraise the condemned property's value, "any subsequent
proceeding shall only affect the amount of compensation to be allowed."
2 1
15. State ex rel. Washington University Medical Center Redev. Corp. v.
Gaertner, No. 42237 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
16. Transfer was ordered under Mo. CONST. art. V, § 9 (1976); Mo. R. Civ. P.
84.02.
17. The condemnor argued that in a condemnation jury trial the issue is lim-
ited to the amount of damages to be awarded the condemnee for the taking. Since
the damages claimed by the landowner arose prior to the date of taking, they were
not compensable in a condemnation action. A claim for lost rent, argued the con-
demnor, is an in personam action which cannot be brought in an in rem action.
626 S.W.2d at 375.
18. The landowner argued the language of the compulsory counterclaim rule:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the op-
posing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Mo. R. CIv. P. 55.32(a). The landowner further relied on id. 42.01 ("there shall be
one form of action to be known as a 'civil action' "); id. 41.01(a) (civil rules "shall
govern all civil actions"). The landowner asserted that a condemnation proceeding
is a civil action and thus, under the Rules, the counterclaim was compulsory. 626
S.W.2d at 376-77.
19. 626 S.W.2d at 378.
20. Id. at 375. See Land Clearance Redev. Auth. v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185,
199 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (court "need pursue no further the question of the proper
method of raising" the issue sought to be raised by counterclaim); State ex rel. City
of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, 329 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959) (court
"need not decide" if counterclaim is permissible in condemnation action).
21. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.050(2) (1978). See also Mo. R. Civ. P. 86.08 (filing
of exceptions to commissioners' award). "The effect of the filing of exceptions to the
commissioners' award by either party is the same: a jury determination on the
single issue of the fair market value of the property before and after the taking or
1983]
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On the other hand, Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.32(b) requires the
filing of compulsory counterclaims in all civil actions.2 2 The Gaertner court
noted, "Where one statute deals with the subject generally and another
statute deals with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite
way, repugnancy between them will be resolved in favor of the special stat-
ute over the general . 23 Therefore, the court reasoned, the specific
rule limiting the jury issue to the amount of compensation must take prece-
dence over the conflicting general compulsory counterclaim rule.24 After
disposing of the counterclaim, the court stated in dicta that the landowner's
only remedy lay in a separate personal action sounding in tort.
25
The Gaertner court based its conclusion that counterclaims cannot be
maintained in condemnation proceedings on Missouri case law. A review
of those cases, however, reveals scant authority regarding the procedural
issue involved. In two condemnation decisions in the early 1960's, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court permitted a counterclaim in one26 and dismissed a
counterclaim in the other for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted.2 7 The court did not analyze the procedural question in either
case.28 In 1965, the court decided a condemnation case in which the land-
damages sustained by the defendant." State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Man-
ley, 549 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
22. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.32(a); note 18 supra.
23. 626 S.W.2d at 377 (quoting State v. Bey, 599 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980)). See also State ex rel. Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. Dickherber, 576
S.W.2d 532, 536-37 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
24. 626 S.W.2d at 377.
25. Id. at 378 ("[L]andowner's relief lies in pursuing in a separate action the
claim now alleged and stated in his counterclaim. Our prior cases have recognized
such a right on the part of the landowner.").
26. In State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Schwabe, 335 S.W.2d 15 (Mo.
1960), the court allowed a counterclaim in a condemnation proceeding. The coun-
terclaim sought to reform the deed by which the landowners previously had con-
veyed property to the Commission. The landowners attempted to add a reservation
of an access right of way allegedly left out due to a mutual mistake of fact. Id. at 22.
27. In State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Hammel, 372 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.
1963), the court dismissed the landowner's counterclaim which sought specific per-
formance of a purported agreement by the Commission to construct an overpass
necessary for the landowner's access to his property. Id. at 853. The court held that
the counterclaim failed to state a cause of action because the Commission had
abandoned the plan and sought acquisition of the property by condemnation. Id.
at 854-55.
28. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Hammel, 372 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.
1963); State ex ref. State Highway Comm'n v. Schwabe, 335 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1960).
Neither opinion addressed the permissibility of counterclaims in condemnation pro-
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owner cross-claimed on an unrelated issue.2 9 The court interpreted chapter
523 as a special statute, "largely containing its own specific procedures for
condemnation issues only," 30 and dismissed the cross-claim as beyond the
purview of the condemnation proceeding.
3 1
In a 1970 condemnation case, the landowner counterclaimed for the
difference in market value between the date of taking and the date, two
years earlier, when the urban redeveloper allegedly induced tenants to va-
cate. The court ruled that the claim failed to allege facts supporting a tak-
ing at the earlier date and neatly sidestepped the procedural issue.32 The
dissent, however, argued for the counterclaim's permissibility, reasoning
that the compulsory counterclaim rule applies to all civil actions including
condemnation proceedings.
33
Though the Gaertner court relied solely on Missouri case law,34 a 1981
New Hampshire case presents an almost identical fact situation. In City of
29. Conduit Indus. Redev. Corp. v. Leubke, 397 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Mo. 1965)
(cross-claim for breach of contract).
30. Id. at 672-73.
31. 397 S.W.2d at 674. "Although Civil Rules procedures may be applicable
where necessary to fill gaps and expedite proceedings, we do not. consider that all
civil procedure has been grafted onto condemnation proceedings without limita-
tions as to controversies involving issues unrelated to condemnation." Id.
32. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185, 199 (Mo.
En Banc 1970). For an erroneous conclusion that Mormson stands for the permissi-
bility of a counterclaim in a condemnation proceeding, see State ex rel. State High-
way Comm'n v. Wilcox, 535 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
33. 457 S.W.2d at 201-02 (Finch, J., dissenting). The permissibility of a coun-
terclaim in a condemnation proceeding was deemed so important that the drafters
of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code included a provision allowing for it:
The defendant shall assert by way of counterclaim. . . all claims he has
against the plaintiff relating to the property sought to be taken in the
action. Any claim not so pleaded is forever barred. The counterclaim
...and pleadings responsive thereto shall conform to the. . .Rules of
Civil Procedure.
UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 505(b) (1974). The comment to § 505 established
the section as an optional one "intended to prevent a condemnation action from
becoming unduly complex or unnecessarily delayed through the routine filing of
additional pleadings." Id. § 505 comment. As of June 30, 1980, no state had
adopted the Code. Annot., 13 U.L.A. 1 (1980). For a note urging adoption of the
Code in Missouri, see 47 Mo. L. REv. 863 (1982).
34. In addition to the cases discussed in notes 26-33 and accompanying text
supra, the court relied on State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Joe D. Esther, Inc.,
579 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979). The court in that case, relying on State ex
rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Hammel, 372 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1963), dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted a counterclaim for a
mandatory injunction to restrain the Commission from entering the land. 579
S.W.2d at 157. The court did not address the procedural issue.
1983]
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Concord a 5,700 Square Feet of Land,35 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
decided a condemnation proceeding in which the landowner counter-
claimed for breach of contract. The applicable statute, similar to Mis-
souri's, limited the hearing to a determination of "just compensation." 36
The New Hampshire court permitted the counterclaim, noting that the
condemnation statute did not expressly exclude counterclaims. Rather
than relying on the general-specific distinction in statutory construction, the
court reasoned that the overriding legislative intent in enacting the con-
demnation law was the speedy resolution of the damage issue.37 Because
the disposition of the counterclaim would ultimately affect the amount of
compensation to be awarded the landowner, the counterclaim was
permissible.
38
Other states are divided on the issue,39 but the reasoning of Cit of Con-
cord, rather than Gaertner, appears consistent with policy considerations.
The purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule is to avoid a multiplicity
of lawsuits and to dispose of litigation more efficiently by deciding related
claims in a single action.4 ° The Gaertner decision, however, will force the
initiation of additional suits, resulting in added expenses for litigants and
increased workloads for courts. Final resolution of the disputed compensa-
tion issue will be unnecessarily delayed. The general-specific statutory dis-
35. 121 N.H. 170, 427 A.2d 46 (1981).
36. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:24 (Supp. 1981-1982). See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 523.050 (1978).
37. 121 N.H. at 172, 427 A.2d at 48. Similarly, Mo. R. Civ. P. 41.03 states,
"Rules 41 to 101, inclusive, shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action."
38. 121 N.H. at 172, 427 A.2d at 48. The court stated:
In the instant case, the defendant's counterclaim grew out of the circum-
stances surrounding the condemnation proceeding and was factually and
logically related to the plaintiff's petition. Resolution of the defendant's
claim actually resolved the matter of compensation and prevented the
need for further proceedings. . . . Under these circumstances, we hold
that it was proper for the trial court to allow the defendant's
counterclaim.
Id.
39. For cases narrowly interpreting the range of issues allowable in condemna-
tion proceedings, see Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Datry, 235 Ga.
568, 580, 220 S.E.2d 905, 913 (1975) (evidence of consequential damage from noise,
smoke inadmissible); Department of Transp. v. Newmark, 34 Ill. App. 3d 811, 814,
341 N.E.2d 133, 135-36 (1975) (evidence of landowner's other property and "prior
knowledge" inadmissible). Other courts have given broader scope to issues raised in
condemnation actions. See Block v. Orlando-Orange County Expressway Auth.,
313 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (certain counterclaims allowed); Bailey
v. State, 57 Hawaii 144, 149, 552 P.2d 365, 367 (1976) (compulsory counterclaim
must be pleaded in condemnation proceeding).
40. See State ex rel. Buchanan v. Jensen, 379 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. En Banc
1964); Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.32.
[Vol. 48
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tinction relied on by the court is a weak rationale when compared to these
important policy factors, especially where the Gaertner decision is founded
on the absence of references to counterclaims rather than an explicit statu-
tory mandate.
4 1
III. REMEDIES FOR CONDEMNATION BLIGHT
The Gaertner court's denial of counterclaims bars their use as a remedy
by victims of condemnation blight, but the court recognized the inequitable
economic damage to landowners attributable to announcements of blight.4 2
The Gaertner court faced two obstacles to providing alternative relief to Mis-
souri landowners. First, the taking of property in Missouri, absent aggra-
vated delay or untoward activity,43 does not occur until either the
condemnor pays the commissioners' award into the registry of the court or
trial commences after the condemnor requests a jury determination.' Mis-
souri courts consistently refuse to use any other date for valuation pur-
poses. 45 Second, American law traditionally equates just compensation
with fair market value at the time of the taking.4 6 Despite a decrease in
value caused by condemnation blight, Missouri courts limit a landowner's
recovery to the market value of the condemned property at the date of tak-
ing. The effect of the rule is to preclude claims for either decreased value or
lost rental income caused by the blight.4 7
41. See 626 S.W.2d at 377. Since resolution of the counterclaim does directly
affect compensation awarded to the landowner, the limitation of condemnation
proceedings to "the amount of compensation to be allowed" should not preclude
counterclaims. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.020(2) (1978).
42. "Between the time of blighting and the time of taking, the property fre-
quently has deteriorated substantially in value at great loss to the landowner." 626
S.W.2d at 376.
43. The date of valuation for a taking in Missouri can be moved back in time
upon proof by the landowner of aggravated delay or untoward activity. See Land
Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185, 199 (Mo. En Banc 1970);
Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Massood, 526 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1975). As the court in Massood noted, the chances for either of these factors
being found are slight: "[I]t is difficult to envision a situation, unusual circum-
stances excepted, when a condemning authority can be said to be guilty of 'aggra-
vated delay' or 'untoward activity,' so far as a premature announcement of
condemnation is concerned." 526 S.W.2d at 358.
44. See Conduit Indus. Redev. Corp. v. Luebke, 397 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo.
1965); St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Mo. 1964); City of
St. Louis v. International Harvester Co., 350 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Mo. En Banc 1961);
City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839, 848 (Mo. 1960).
45. 626 S.W.2d at 375.
46. Kanner, Condemnation Blight:Just How Just isJust Compensation?, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 765, 773 (1973).
47. As recently as 1979, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that condemnation
blight was not compensable in Missouri. Aronstein v. Missouri State Highway
1983)
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Under the constraint of these two rules, the Gaertner court suggested
Comm'n, 586 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo. En Banc 1979). In failing to recompense land-
owners for economic loss caused by condemnation blight, Missouri courts have
compared it to threat of condemnation, initiation of condemnation proceedings,
and preliminary negotiation toward condemnation, none of which are considered a
"taking" or "damaging" under Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 26. See State ex rel. State High-
way Comm'n v. Samborski, 463 S.W.2d 896, 903-04 (Mo. 1971); Hamer v. State
Highway Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Mo. 1957).
In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (En
Banc 1933), the court rejected the landowner's request for compensation for lost
rents and inability to rent the property during the pendency of the condemnation
proceeding. The court stated that damages suffered by a condemnee due to the
pendency of condemnation proceedings are not compensable in the proceeding.
Damages awarded in condemnation must be for damage to the property itself
rather than harm to the landowner personally. Because a loss of revenue is a per-
sonal loss, the court reasoned, it is not an element ofjust compensation. Id. at 1124-
25, 63 S.W.2d at 817. Accord Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869,
874 (Mo. 1957). In St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964),
the court again ruled against the landowner, who had objected to the trial court's
limitation of property value to the date when the award was deposited with the
court. The court dismissed the argument, establishing valuation at the time of the
taking rather than any prior time. Id. at 147.
Missouri cases after 1939 rely on the language in Danforth v. United States,
308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939): "A reduction or increase in the value of property may
occur by reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project. Such
changes in value are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered a 'taking'
in the constitutional sense." Danforth concerned condemnation proceedings arising
under federal flood control legislation, not urban redevelopment. The Supreme
Court recently reiterated the same rule. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263
n.9 (1980), noted in 46 Mo. L. REV. 868 (1981). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit has substantially followed the reasoning ofDanforth. Constru-
ing Missouri law, the court wrote, "[Tihe mere declaration of blight and other ini-
tial steps authorizing condemnation, even if they result in a decline in property
values, do not constitute a taking requiring compensation to the property owner."
Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979). The court suggested, however, that action falling short
of acquisition could amount to a taking if it deprived the landowner of most of his
beneficial interest in the property and significantly depressed its value. d. The
language in Garland would provide a greater scope of recovery than the "untoward
activity or aggravated delay" standard imposed by Missouri courts. See note 43
supra. Nevertheless, Garland does not recognize a landowner's right to recover lost
rental income or decreased property value resulting from condemnation blight ab-
sent extreme circumstances. The case has been interpreted to preclude compensa-
tion for mere unsalability of property caused by knowledge of future governmental
acquisition. Allen Family Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 525 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D.
Mo. 1981).
Some members of the state's judiciary are critical of the position taken by Mis-
souri courts:
A grossly premature announcement of condemnation, however well-moti-
[Vol. 48
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two alternative types of damages available to landowners victimized by
condemnation blight. Although not clearly articulated in the opinion, the
first remedy would compensate landowners only for decreased property
value caused by blight, while the second would limit a landowner's recovery
to lost rental income.
A. Decrease in Propery Value
The first solution suggested by Gaertner was the enactment of a statute
that, while not changing the date of legal taking, would alter the valuation
of the property by including compensation for the decrease in property
value between the first announcement of condemnation plans and the initi-
ation of the condemnation proceeding.4 8 In effect, the date of property val-
uation would relate back to a time prior to the commencement of
condemnation proceedings, thereby compensating the landowner for de-
creased value attributable to impending condemnation. Such legislation
has been introduced in the Missouri General Assembly, but it has not been
enacted.4 9 Several states have adopted similar statutes.5"
Even in the absence of statutory authority, courts in other states have
allowed landowners to recover for deceased property value through judicial
interpretation ofjust compensation, either by moving back the date of valu-
vated and regardless of how or by whom initiated, may, as a practical
matter, penalize property owners if the fair market value of the property is
determined solely as of the date of the de jure taking. This is particularly
true in situations involving the twentieth century innovation of urban
redevelopment.
Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Massood, 526 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1975). Accord State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Armacost Motors, 552
S.W.2d 360, 365 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
48. 626 S.W.2d at 378. "The ideal solution. . . would be for the legislature to
make provision for the allowance of damages. . . or to provide for a different time of
taking in cases where the condemnor has cast a cloud of blight upon the property in
advance of the actual taking." Id.
49. Two bills allowing compensation for diminution in value were introduced
in Missouri's 80th General Assembly. Both contained identical language:
In addition, the landowners shall receive just compensation for any dam-
aging of the property or for any diminution in the value of the property
prior to the date of taking, by the public project for which the property is
condemned, or by any announcements or acts of the condemning author-
ity, its officials, employees, agents, or contractors concerning such public
project, if the trier of fact shall find that said damages or diminution in
the value of the property are proximately caused thereby.
S. 413, 80th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (1979); S. 549, 80th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. § 4 (1980). Neither was enacted.
50. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 9.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-105(b) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:1-9, 40:55-21.10 (West
Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-604 (Purdon Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 32.09(5)(b) (West Supp. 1981).
1983]
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ation to before the de jure taking or by determining value at the date of
taking absent the effects of condemnation blight.5 1 These courts rely pri-
marily on United States v. Miller,52 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that where the government contemplated a series of condemna-
tions, landowners of tracts later condemned could not benefit from appreci-
ated values attributable to the project. The Court established "the date of
governmental commitment" as the date of valuation.53 Subsequently, some
courts treated depreciation caused by a condemnation plan similarly.54 The
New York Court of Appeals fixed compensation, upon proof of condemna-
tion blight, as the value of the property at the time of the de jure taking,
"but for the debilitating threat of condemnation."5 5 Other courts have de-
termined the date of valuation to be just before the condemnor took "active
steps" to implement the plan5" or immediately preceding the time when the
51. See, e.g., Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d
453, 456 (Ky. 1965); City of Shreveport v. Bernstein, 391 So. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (La.
Ct. App. 1980); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 258, 269
N.E.2d 895, 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 359 (1971); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 119
Ohio App. 525, 533, 190 N.E.2d 52, 57 (1963). The two approaches achieve identi-
cal results-the landowner receives compensation for the full value of the con-
demned property, undecreased by the condemnor's activities.
52. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
53. Id. at 377. In a later decision, the Court held that depreciation in value
due to prospective condemnation cannot be considered in valuation. United States
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961). The Court went on in
dicta to recognize the abuses made possible by its decision: "It would be manifestly
unjust to permit a public authority to depreciate property values by a threat...
[of condemnation] and then to take advantage of this depression in the price which
it must pay for the property when eventually condemned." Id. (quoting 1 L.
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 105, at 447 (2d ed.
1953)). See Lincoln Loan Co. v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n, 274 Or. 49,
56-57, 545 P.2d 105, 110 (1976) (compensation for condemnation blight
recognized).
54. See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961)
(valuation set on date condemnor "was committed" to project); Foster v. City of
Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 666 (E.D. Mich. 1966)(valuation "immediately before
the city took any steps to carry out the work of the project'), aqfd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). See general/y Comment, Date of Valuation in Eminent
Domain: Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 319 (1963).
55. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 258, 269 N.E.2d 895,
905, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 359 (1971). The court went on to require proof by the
landowner of affirmative acts by the condemnor directly resulting in decreased
property value. Id.
56. City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 533, 190 N.E.2d 52, 57
(1963). The court used prior valuation to compensate the landowner where, at the
time of the condemnation proceeding, only the landowner's building and 35 to 40
other buildings still stood out of 584 structures originally included in the project,
and all of the landowner's tenants moved out pursuant to letters sent to them by the
condemnor. Id. at 526-28, 190 N.E.2d at 53-54.
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project's existence became "generally known."5 7  A Louisiana court
achieved a similar result by using the capitalization of rent method of valu-
ation based on the building's full occupancy prior to the creation of the
redevelopment plan.
5 8
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that it may allow re-
covery of interim damages after a governmental unit has substantially im-
peded a landowner's use of his property. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
Ciy of San Diego, 59 the landowner brought an action for inverse condemna-
tion against the city based on a zoning ordinance that deprived the land-
owner of its intended use of the property.6" The Court disposed of the case
on a procedural issue,6 1 but five justices indicated their belief that a regula-
tion of the use of property, falling short of condemnation, can constitute a
taking.62 Implementation of the plan would trigger the requirement ofjust
compensation "where the effects completely deprive the owner of all or
most of his interest in the property."6 3 Although the case involved zoning,
the same rule arguably could apply to cases of condemnation blight if
courts found that an announcement of blight caused substantial depriva-
tion of landowners' beneficial use of their property. The Gaertner opinion
does not consider this body of decisions, no doubt because the counterclaim
demanded only lost rents and the appropriate date for property valuation
was not at issue.
57. Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453, 456
(Ky. 1965).
58. City of Shreveport v. Bernstein, 391 So. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (La. Ct. App.
1980).
59. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
60. Id. at 623. The landowner intended to use the property as a site for a nu-
clear power plant. When the landowner acquired the land, it was zoned in part for
industrial purposes and in part as undeveloped. The city subsequently enacted a
plan rezoning the area for long-range conservation purposes and announced its in-
tent to acquire the land eventually. Id. at 624-25.
61. Id. at 633. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion refused to reach the merits
of the case because the decision of the California Court of Appeals under review was
not a final judgment. Justice Blackmun reasoned that since the state court had not
resolved whether a taking had occurred, the Supreme Court was without jurisdic-
tion to review the merits. Id.
62. Four justices joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion but made clear
his agreement with the dissent on the merits of the case. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
63. Id. at 652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The rule enunciated by Justice
Brennan would move back the actual date of the taking and require the payment of
just compensation beginning on the date the regulation causing the taking became
enforceable. The dissent did not specify the measure of compensation; the amount
would be determined by "ordinary principles." Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
However, the dissent said, "As a starting point, the value of the property taken may
be ascertained as of the date of the taking." Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1983]
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Significantly, neither the case law interpreting the date of valuation
nor the statutes changing the date of valuation compensate landowners for
lost rents. Only the diminution of property value caused by the condemnor
is added to the concept of just compensation. Therefore, passage of similar
legislation in Missouri would not assist a Gaertner-type landowner who al-
leges only lost rental income.
B. Lost Rents
The Gaertner court's second suggested remedy was that the landowner's
only present form of relief lay in a separate tort action. 4 The court deemed
the post-condemnation action a right already recognized in Missouri, but
none of the cases cited by the court provides explicitly for that remedy.65
The strongest support appears as dicta in the court's 1933 decision in State ex
rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck,6 6 which indicates that a personal action sounding
in tort may be available: "The damages sustained from the institution and
pendancy of the condemnation proceeding itself, if any, must be an action
sounding in tort."6 7 The Beck court refused, however, to decide whether a
subsequent action could be brought by the landowner.68
The Gaertner dicta suggests that the Missouri Supreme Court will allow
a subsequent suit for recovery of lost rents. If limited to the facts of Gaertner,
this may provide for recovery of lost rents caused by condemnation blight
even though Missouri has not yet recognized recovery of decreased property
value attributable to blight.69 Significantly, claims for recovery of lost rents
64. 626 S.W.2d at 378.
65. The court cited Land Clearance Redev. Auth. v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d
185, 193-94 (Mo. En Banc 1970), which merely quotes language from State ex rel.
City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 1126, 63 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Mo. En Banc
1933). The court also relied on Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Massood, 526
S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975), a condemnation case in which the court
dismissed the landowner's argument of condemnation blight. The Massood court
discussed the theory of condemnation blight in dicta but did not mention a remedy
for the landowner. The Gaertner court also cited State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Wilcox, 535 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976), in which the court of
appeals erroneously cited Morrison as authority for the proposition that relief for
decreased property value sustained before taking can be granted in a separate pro-
ceeding. Id. at 135. The same court, in fact, also incorrectly asserted that use of a
counterclaim had been upheld in Morrison, when it had not. Id. See note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
66. 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. En Banc 1933).
67. Id. at 1123, 63 S.W.2d at 815 (emphasis added).
68. "We do not undertake to decide if the. . .[landowner] is entitled to any
damages on account of the pendency or delay of the condemnation proceeding it-
self, and if there is any damage. . . it is of a personal character. . . and is not an
element to be considered by the commissioners in assessing benefits and damages in
this proceeding." Id. at 1126, 63 S.W.2d at 817.
69. 626 S.W.2d at 376.
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due to impending condemnation have enjoyed less success across the coun-
try than claims for decreased value.
70
Courts have been reluctant to compensate landowners for lost rents,
based in part on the traditional distinction between property value as a
property right, compensable under the taking clause, and lost rents as aper-
sonal right of the landowner, historically noncompensable. 7 ' Nevertheless,
several courts have recently recognized the right to property as a personal
right and allowed recovery of rental income.72 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in the landmark decision of Luber v. Milwaukee County, 73 stated that
recovery of lost rental income caused by condemnation blight was an ele-
ment ofjust compensation and ruled that a statute limiting recovery of lost
rent was unconstitutional.74 Loss of rent is similarly recoverable under just
compensation in California, but only upon a showing that the condemnor
acted unreasonably. 75 These courts determined that recovery of lost rent
70. Sackman, Condemnation Blight-A Problem in Compensability and Value, 1973
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 157, 184-85. See, e.g., Hempstead
Warehouse Corp. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572, 573 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Kirkman v.
State Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 428, 432, 126 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1962).
71. 4 J. SACKMAN & R. VAN BRUNT, supra note 7, § 12.3151[5].
72. Justice Stewart, writing for the United States Supreme Court, cut through
the artificial distinction:
The federal courts have been particularly bedeviled by "mixed" cases in
which both personal and property rights are implicated, and the line be-
tween them has been difficult to draw with any consistency or principled
objectivity. . . . Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not
have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without un-
lawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is
in truth a "personal" right ....
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 551-52 (1972).
73. 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
74. Id. at 283, 177 N.W.2d at 386. The invalidated statute, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 32.19(4) (1961), limited recovery of lost rent to the amount lost in the year prior to
condemnation to the extent that it exceeded the average annual rental losses caused
by vacancies during the first four years of the five-year period preceding the taking.
Id. at 275, 177 N.W.2d at 382. The decision was reaffirmed in Maxey v. Redevel-
opment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 392, 288 N.W.2d 794, 802 (1980). Accord
City of Muskegon v. DeVries, 59 Mich. App. 415, 419, 229 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1975).
75. Klopping v. Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 53, 500 P.2d 1345, 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1, 11 (1972). The California Supreme Court in Klopping was confronted with a case
in which the city made public announcements of an intent to condemn, abandoned
the plan after one and a half years, and simultaneously announced an intent to
resume condemnation proceedings. The landowner, in an action for inverse con-
demnation, claimed damages for lost rental income. The court stated that lost rent
directly affects market value. Id. at 54 n.7, 500 P.2d at 1357 n.7, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
13 n.7. As a test for liability, the court adopted an unreasonable delay between
precondemnation publicity and the ensuing condemnation action. Id. at 52, 500
14
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falls within the scope of just compensation; if Missouri adopts a similar in-




Gaertner did not definitely establish a cause of action for loss of rental
income. The only certain impact of the case vill be the preclusion of coun-
terclaims in condemnation proceedings. Under current Missouri law,
neither lost rents nor decreased property value is compensable. The lan-
guage in Gaertner, however, indicates a willingness to entertain future tort
actions for loss of rental income induced by condemnation blight. This
would signal a major shift in Missouri law. Gaertner says little about
whether the court will permit the additional recovery of decreased property
value in a tort action.
Requiring a subsequent tort suit to award relief to landowners, as sug-
gested in Gaertner, is inconsistent with the general policy of consolidating
related claims. It also imposes the burden of bringing the action on the
landowner who has been the passive victim of condemnation blight. Addi-
tional statutory provisions, court rules, or a new judicial interpretation of




P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11. See also Washington Mkt. Enters. v. City of
Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 122, 343 A.2d 408, 416 (1975).
An appellate court in Louisiana also awarded lost rental income accruing as of
the condemning authority's initially estimated date of condemnation. City of
Shreveport v. Bernstein, 391 So. 2d 1331, 1333-35 (La. Ct. App. 1980). That deci-
sion, however, was grounded not on just compensation but on a special provision of
the Louisiana Constitution which read, "The owner shall be compensated to the
full extent of his loss." LA. CONST. art. I, § 4. Bemstein construed that provision to
require compensation to the landowner for any economic loss caused by the con-
demnation, including lost rental income. 391 So. 2d at 1334-35.
76. Mo. REv. STAT. § 523.050(2) (1978) differs from the Wisconsin and Cali-
fornia statutes only in its limitation to the issue of "compensation" rather than "just
compensation." The Missouri statute, however, must be interpreted in conjunction
with Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26, which uses the phrase "just compensation." See La-
bor's Educ. & Political Club-Independent v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Mo.
En Banc 1977). The language of the three statutes can be construed similarly.
77. Under the concept of just compensation, the landowner should be made
whole for any public taking. In urban redevelopment projects this involves two
distinct elements: compensation for the value of the property prior to any fluctua-
tion in value caused by the project and reimbursement for any income, including
rental income, lost because of the project. Moving back the date of valuation by
statute would solve the depreciated value problem, but it would offer no relief for
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the landowner's loss of income between the valuation date and the date of the de
jure taking:
Compensating the condemnee for the full undepressed value of his prop-
erty does not compensate him for the lostfiudts of that property while he
remained as owner of the property and for the unrequited expenses he is
put to in order to preserve his property until it is formally taken by the
condemnor.
4 J. SACKMAN & R. VAN BRUNT, supra note 7, § 12.3151[5]. The post-condemna-
tion remedy suggested by the Gaertner court places the burden of expenses and initi-
ation of the suit on the landowner, who is merely attempting to recoup his loss
caused by the condemnor. This form of relief is also inadequate.
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